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Globalisation – the Bane of 
Popular Sovereignty? 
John Pyke 
This book’s theme – challenges to the sovereignty of nation-states from the 
pressure of globalisation – has special piquancy for me. I have long advo-
cated1 that the constitutional law of our sovereign nation2 should expressly 
recognise the sovereignty of the people, and provide mechanisms through 
which the people can enact enforceable legal rules specifying that their 
legislators must not make certain laws, or must advance certain objectives. Yet 
now it is suggested this notion is anachronistic, or futile, in view of nations’ 
increasing subjection to international law and international markets.  
 In response, I first describe the different ways in which a people may 
be said to be sovereign; discuss examples of constitutions that put these dif-
ferent ways into effect; criticise Australia’s feebler manifestations of popular 
sovereignty; and suggest we emulate those systems where real sovereignty of 
the people is most developed. Finally, I address two globalisation-based ob-
jections to popular sovereignty, demonstrating that reports of its demise are 
greatly exaggerated. 
The sovereignty of the people: fiction and 
various levels of reality 
In a democracy, we hear frequent references to the ‘sovereignty of the 
people’. However, this can have a variety of meanings in reality. Edmund 
                                                        
1 Primarily through submissions to public inquiries into constitutional reform. See Elec-
toral and Administrative Review Commission (Queensland), Review of the Preservation and 
Enhancement of Individuals’ Rights and Freedoms, Public Submissions, Vol 3, Submission 130; 
and my submission to the Queensland Constitutional Review Commission (at http: 
//www.constitution.qld.gov.au/subs/sub_pyke.html). These focus on State constitu-
tional issues, but my arguments readily apply to the Commonwealth Constitution. 
2 Only recently, ironically, has Australia’s independent sovereignty been recognised: New 
South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337; Sue v Hill 
(1999) 73 ALJR 1016). Now it seems (if we believe the globalisation rhetoric) it might be 
nugatory anyway: Sic transit imperium Australiae! 
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Morgan persuasively suggests3 that the concept was first used as a fiction, by 
people fighting for power against rivals who invoked another then-powerful 
fiction: the divine right of kings. Although (as Morgan agrees) the fiction 
was eventually given more and more reality, it has varying degrees of reality 
when English, Australian and American constitutional law are compared.  
Merely political sovereignty 
In the 19th century even Dicey, famous for insisting that in England the 
Parliament was legally sovereign,4 accepted that the word also had a political 
sense5 – and that this ‘political sovereign’, the authority whose will was 
ultimately obeyed, was the electorate.6 Now that every adult citizen (with a 
few reasonable disqualifications) is represented, the fiction is even more 
credible: in a sense that we can all believe, ‘the people’ exercise their ‘sov-
ereignty’ at every election.  
 But, where Diceyan theory remains unmodified, there is a basic prob-
lem with this notion. Under this model, the people’s political sovereignty 
depends, in law, absolutely on the grace of the legally sovereign Parliament. 
Parliament enacted the laws that gave everyone the vote, and that limit its 
term – and as a matter of law Parliament could repeal them. A system which 
says Parliament is legally sovereign, but which relies on politicians’ decency 
(or fear of the electorate) to ensure the people remain the political sovereign, 
is curious indeed. Anyone but the English would expect at least universal 
franchise and regular fair elections to be guaranteed in a document of higher 
legal status than ordinary legislation. 
Legal sovereignty of a reactive kind 
In Australia, of course, no parliament has an unfettered legal sovereignty. 
The powers of the Commonwealth and State parliaments are limited by the 
Commonwealth Constitution. In the free speech cases,7 and again in 
McGinty’s Case,8 three Justices of the High Court have expressly recognised 
that the sovereign power over this Constitution is vested in the people. The 
rules protected by this sovereignty seem to satisfy the criteria above for 
                                                        
3 E Morgan (1988) Inventing the People, WW Norton. 
4 AV Dicey (1885) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (7th edn, 1915), p 39. 
5 Compare Gummow J’s reference in McGinty v WA (1996) 186 CLR 140 at 275 to a 
‘popular or political meaning’ of sovereignty. 
6 Dicey (1885); 7th edn, (1915), p 73. 
7 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (‘ACTV’) (1992) 177 CLR 106 per Mason CJ at 138 and Deane and 
Toohey JJ at 70. 
8 McGinty v WA (1996) 186 CLR 140 per Toohey J at 199, McHugh J at 230 and 
Gummow J at 274–5. 
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constitutionally guaranteeing the people’s political sovereignty. As to the 
Federal Parliament, the Constitution guarantees a term limit9 and, although 
on its face it leaves electoral qualifications up to parliament,10 the implica-
tions drawn from the words ‘directly chosen by the people’ in the free 
speech cases certainly guarantee the universal franchise as well as ‘freedom 
of communication in relation to public affairs and political discussion’.11 As 
the latter guarantee extends to laws affecting State political affairs,12 it may 
be speculated that some guarantees as to State electoral processes may be 
implied as well – though no guarantee of equal electoral districts, at least for 
the moment.13  
 However, even as their Honours recognised the sovereignty of the 
people, one of them14 noted accurately that they (we!) are ‘sovereign’ in a 
very qualified way, because we cannot initiate Constitutional amendments 
ourselves. The Parliament proposes and we the electors merely dispose. 
Indeed the reality is somewhat worse. Although s 128 does allow for a refer-
endum if one House passes an Alteration Bill twice, only proposals favoured 
by the executive have any chance; it is generally agreed that because the 
Governor-General will follow Ministerial advice on whether to hold a 
referendum, an Alteration Bill sponsored by Opposition or Independent 
Senators will get nowhere. So in reality, the executive proposes and we the 
electors dispose.15 If we are the sovereign, we are merely a reactive sovereign, 
not a ‘proactive’ one. 
Problems with either of the above two models 
The fact that our reactive legal sovereignty guarantees our political sover-
eignty is certainly a source of some comfort – at the end of a parliamentary 
term, we can throw the scoundrels out. But, especially given that in our Par-
liaments the executive generally has the loyalty of the majority of members, 
there is no guarantee even of rights closely connected with the preservation 
of our sovereignty. Consider three recent examples from Australian States: 
• If the executive has first drafted a liberal Freedom of Information Act that 
it later finds irksome, it can push through Parliament an amendment 
                                                        
 9 Section 28. 
10 Sections 8 and 30. 
11 The phrase is from ACTV per Mason CJ at 138. 
12 Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211; Lange v Australian Broad-
casting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
13 McGinty v WA (1996) 186 CLR 140  
14 Gummow J in McGinty at 275–6  
15 And the situation is the same in those States where some provisions of the Constitution 
Act are ‘entrenched’ by ‘manner and form’ provisions. In each case only the parliament 
can initiate change, and except in times of minority government only proposals from the 
government benches will be passed by parliament. 
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that broadens the exemptions so that any papers taken to a Cabinet 
meeting, whether or not considered by the meeting or even relevant 
to it, are exempt. Then both major political parties can play the game 
of promising to repeal the amendments in opposition, and neglecting 
to do so in government.16 
• If the Premier is about to be subpoenaed to give evidence of a meet-
ing with leading businessmen, the executive can have Parliament 
amend the Evidence Act so as to reverse the decision in Conway v 
Rimmer17 by restoring the conclusive status of a certificate by the 
Attorney-General claiming Crown privilege.18 
• If the Auditor-General is embarrassing the executive (a sign that he is 
doing his job!), the executive can tell Parliament to ‘privatise’ some of 
the Auditor’s functions,19 and reduce his budget to inhibit his carry-
ing out the remaining ones. 
Instead of mere political sovereignty, exercised only on polling day, we need 
rules that limit the powers of Parliaments and executive governments 
throughout the other three (in many jurisdictions, four) years between elec-
tions, and we need to be able to initiate the entrenchment of such rules in 
constitutions ourselves. 
Real (‘proactive’) legal sovereignty, and mechanisms for 
implementing it 
We hear less about America’s State Constitutions than about its federal 
document,20 but the former offer interesting precedents for truly imple-
menting of the sovereignty of the people. As Edmund Morgan has noted,21 
the fiction of popular sovereignty eventually gave birth, in the United States, 
to the notion that the many could construct safeguards against the few. It is 
pleasing to be able to note, in a book sponsored by the Fulbright Commis-
sion, that we find two safeguard mechanisms used widely in the United 
                                                        
16 Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld) s 36(1) as progressively amended in 1993 and 1995. 
See WB Lane, ‘Reform of Administrative Law in Queensland’ (1996) 79 Canberra Bulletin 
of Public Administration 174 at 180–1. 
17 [1968] AC 910. 
18 Evidence (Amendment) Act 1979 (NSW). The new sections were repealed, after a change of 
government, by the Evidence (Crown Privilege) Amendment Act 1988.  
19 Audit (Amendment) Act 1997 (Vic). See W Funnell (1997) ‘The Curse of Sisyphus: Public 
Sector Audit Independence in an Age of Economic Rationalism’ 56 AJPA 87; M Rayner, 
(1997) ‘Watchdog on a Leash’, Eureka Street, December, 24–5; R Manne (1999) ‘Vic-
toria’s State of Silence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 September. 
20 ‘Public law scholarship and professional literature are overwhelmingly occupied with the 
single national government’. HA Linde (1999) ‘Structures and Terms of Consent: Dele-
gation, Discretion, Separation of Powers, Representation, Participation, Accountability?’ 
20 Cardozo Law Review 823 at 824. 
21 E Morgan (1988) Inventing the People, WW Norton, pp 282–5.  
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States at State level. One is Citizen-Initiated Referendum (CIR); the other, a 
requirement that an elected Constitutional Convention be held (or at least 
that a referendum decide if one shall be held) at regular intervals, or if a 
certain number of voters demand. If I count right, 14 State Constitutions 
allow constitutional amendment by CIR; another 14 require that if no Con-
stitutional Convention has been held in the last nine, 10, 16, or 20 years, a 
referendum is to be held giving the electors the power to demand such a 
Convention; and 14 enable a Convention to be called via CIR.22 Four States 
have two of these mechanisms, and one (Montana) has all three, so 24 States 
have at least one.23 Australia has copied many important ideas from Amer-
ica’s federal Constitution; as we emerge from the shadow of colonialism and 
the legacy of Professor Dicey, we could do worse than to copy from Ameri-
can State Constitutions also.24 
 If mechanisms like these were available, they could be used to intro-
duce Bills of Rights (and other controls on legislative and executive power) 
into our State and federal constitutions – and make them rather more like 
American constitutions. Despite the fears of gloomy liberals,25 I suspect a ma-
jority of Australians would support entrenchment of the traditional ‘Bill of 
Rights rights’, including guarantees of fair criminal process – but exactly what 
is enacted will be up to the majority to decide, and they may prefer more or 
fewer restrictions from time to time. If at any time the people feel confident 
that the Parliament or executive is unlikely to misuse its powers, they might 
even take restrictions away, but they would retain power to re-impose them. 
The actual list of rights and restrictions selected is less important than the 
overriding principle that the people have authority to specify the limits of 
legislative power and to vary these limits from time to time. 
 The United States experience also shows that entrenched, justiciable 
Constitutions are not used solely to mandate ‘right-wing’ classical liberal 
ideas of laissez-faire and limited government. They can, and do, also direct 
governments to take positive action for the collective good. In what is 
generally seen as the world’s least ‘Socialist’ democracy, almost all State 
Constitutions command that there shall be State-funded education. Many 
require it to be ‘uniform’, ‘thorough’ or ‘efficient’; hence in 1971 California’s 
Supreme Court could rule that distributing funds among school districts 
                                                        
22 I propose to post a complete table of these details on my website at http:// 
ozconstinfo.freehomepage.com/US_States.html. 
23 I am not saying that the people of 26 US States are ‘not sovereign’. Remember, I distin-
guish forms of sovereignty. The people of those States, like the people of the United 
States as a whole, indeed enjoy political sovereignty and reactive legal sovereignty – but they 
do not have proactive legal sovereignty, and in my opinion they are the poorer for that. 
24 See P O’Brien and M Webb (eds) (1991) The Executive State: WA Inc and the Constitution, 
Constitutional Press, for similar proposals. 
25 See particularly C Puplick (1996) ‘Citizen-Initiated Referendums: The Case Against’ in K 
Wiltshire (ed), Direct Democracy: Citizens-Initiated Referendums, Constitutional Centenary 
Foundation. 
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proportional to the property taxes raised in each (creating richer schools in 
affluent districts) was unconstitutional. Over the next 20 years, about half 
the States saw lawsuits challenging their school funding systems, about half 
of which succeeded.26 This is the kind of policy that (assuming that a ma-
jority wanted) we voters could impose on our governments if Australians, 
too, enjoyed proactive popular sovereignty. 
 CIR is controversial in Australia; often advocated, but vigorously op-
posed. The literature on CIR27 contains the standard arguments, which need 
not be repeated here, for and against a system that involves proactive popu-
lar sovereignty (‘direct democracy’). Of course, to realise popular sovereignty 
it is not strictly necessary to allow the making of ordinary laws by CIR, as 
long as constitutional amendments can be initiated.28 But if even that form 
of CIR is thought to give the uneducated People too much of a say, there is 
the other alternative – that if there has been no Constitutional Convention 
for some years, the people must be asked if they want one, and if so, they 
must be permitted to elect one directly. After all, Constitutional Conventions 
are an established Australian tradition,29 although more in connection with 
the federal than the State constitutions. What I must answer here, however, 
is an objection not much addressed in the CIR debate cited above, and 
never, to my knowledge, raised in respect of Constitutional Conventions – 
that to put such sovereignty into effect (at State or national level) by either 
mechanism would conflict with, or be rendered futile by, the forces of 
globalisation. 
Does proactive popular sovereignty 
clash with globalisation? 
The sovereignty of nations (whoever exercises it within each nation) is now 
said to be under threat from two different, but overlapping, sources. Firstly, 
                                                        
26 See JD Leshy (1990) ‘The State of Constitutional Law in the States of the United States: 
Are There Any Lessons for Australia?’ 20 UWA Law Review 373. 
27 The best recent arguments against CIR are found in DA Bell Jr (1978) ‘The Referendum: 
Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality’ 54 Washington Law Review 1; G Brennan (1997) 
‘Direct Democracy: The Case Against’ Policy (Autumn) 32–4; JN Eule (1990) ‘Judicial 
Review of Direct Democracy’ 90 Yale Law Journal 1503; NE Franklin (1992) ‘Initiative 
and Referendum: Participatory Democracy or Rolling Back the State?’ in M Munro-Clark 
(ed), Citizen Participation in Government, Hale & Iremonger; C Puplick (1996). Arguments in 
favour are presented in G Walker (1987) Initiative and Referendum: The People’s Law, Centre 
for Independent Studies. 
28 In practice, however, limiting CIR to ‘constitutional’ matters tends to invite the ‘constitu-
tionalisation’ of policy matters otherwise left to ordinary statute – eg, the Swiss Consti-
tution’s Art 25 bis which bans slaughter of animals without first stunning them – so, in 
practice, popular sovereignty may require ‘legislative’ as well as ‘constitutional’ CIR.  
29 Conventions whose proposals succeeded at referenda were held in 1891, 1897–8, and the 
mid-1970s. Although the 1999 republic model was rejected, many praised the participa-
tory process of the 1999 Canberra ‘ConCon’. 
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the growth of international customary law and treaties affects domestic legal 
systems more and more, precluding legislators and voters from selecting cer-
tain policies for fear of trans-national disruption. Secondly, the hard facts of 
competition in globalised markets make it futile for nations or States to 
attempt to regulate industries and workplaces. Does either of these forces 
limit what the people of a State or nation might want to enact in the exercise 
of their proactive sovereignty; and if so, which should prevail? My answer is 
that in some cases the conflict is illusory, and in other cases the people are 
perfectly entitled at least to try to make a free choice rather than passively 
wait for the globalisation juggernaut to roll over them. 
Popular sovereignty and ‘redneck’ populism 
Under the Westphalian tradition, nations were supposedly immune from exter-
nal interference in their internal affairs, even if those involved discrimination 
against minorities or the general tyrannisation of the whole populace. Today 
– when most countries at least pay lip service to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and many have signed the protocol allowing 
citizens to seek declarations against their own nation – this extreme sov-
ereignty is no doubt qualified. So if a people, exercising their proactive 
sovereignty, sought to enact a Constitution amendment discriminating 
against a minority, there would indeed be conflict between international 
norms and this particular attempt to assert their sovereignty. 
 However, there would be no such conflict between international norms 
and the principles that justify the sovereignty of the people. I am assuming that, 
under either of the mechanisms advocated, a majority vote is sufficient to 
enact new constitutional provisions. But ‘majority rule’ is not in itself an 
axiom of democracy.30 The reason why we follow majority decisions in a 
democracy is more fundamental: because everyone counts, and equally.31 To 
say that democracy requires not only majority rule but also respect for mi-
norities is not contradictory; instead, both principles are derived from the 
same idea.32 In a democracy, any move to strip one group of its fundamental 
right of political participation can be opposed with the argument ‘If them 
today, why not you tomorrow?’ If that democracy is truly healthy, that 
argument will sway most people’s votes – and if the majority still makes a 
decision that violates some international norm, then international law is only 
reminding the majority of a principle it forgets at its peril. 
                                                        
30 I know of no attempts to justify majority rule as an end in itself, except for an offhanded 
analogy with the vector addition of forces in Locke’s Second Treatise. 
31 Thus a commitment to ‘equal concern and respect’ entails equal votes for all: RM 
Dworkin (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, p 273. 
32 See LG Sager (1981) ‘Rights Scepticism and Process-Based Responses’ 56 New York 
University Law Review 417 at 445. 
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 Moreover, recourse to international law helps overcome the fears of 
the ‘gloomy liberals’ mentioned above. James Madison first realised, and 
many elections have confirmed, that irrational ‘populist’ candidates or 
proposals are less likely to reach majority support in a large than a small 
population.33 So federations can have two possible safeguards against the 
people of a small community exercising what they might think of as their 
local sovereignty to, say, forbid sale of land to people of Asian birth or 
descent. By voluntarily joining a federation, each State and its people agree 
to submit their local sovereignty to the overall sovereignty of the federated 
people. If, as in America, the federal Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, it 
will override anything inconsistent in the State’s laws – or even its Consti-
tution.34 Alternatively, as in Australia, the power over external affairs in a 
federation will almost certainly belong to the national government: therefore 
a federal law implementing the ICCPR and other treaties will also override 
the offensive provision. If the federal Constitution provides mechanisms for 
proactive sovereignty, supporters of the offensive policy can try to ‘consti-
tutionalise’ it at the national level, but they would have the large population 
principle working against them. 
 A more specific fear in the area of discrimination is that the people 
may use proactive sovereignty mechanisms to discriminate against recent 
immigrants; Switzerland is currently debating a proposal to limit the number 
of non-Swiss residents,35 and California adopted a proposition36 banning 
non-naturalised migrants from welfare entitlements. Though these worry 
me, as showing a disregard for the notions of the ‘siblinghood’ and inter-
relatedness of all humanity, it has to be said that whilst no people, under 
principles of international law or general decency, has a right to be actually 
brutal to guests, each people does have a right to regulate entry into itself. 
The fact that such measures may be proposed is not a strong reason for a 
liberal democrat to oppose CIR or other proactive sovereignty measures; if 
the anti-migrant measures are proposed, she or he will still be free to cam-
paign against their adoption. Once a migrant has been naturalised, or once 
children have been born in the new country, of course things are different – 
someone who is a member of a nation is entitled not to be discriminated 
against, under both the rules of international law and the principles under-
lying popular sovereignty. 
                                                        
33 ‘[A]s each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens . . . it will be 
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which 
elections are too often carried’: J Madison, A Hamilton and J Jay (1987) The Federalist 
Papers, Penguin Books, No 10. It is tempting to contrast the success of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation Party in Queensland’s 1998 State election (11 of 89 seats) with its failure to 
win any seats in the federal poll later that year. 
34  Even if the State provision is enacted via referendum. Cf Lucas v Colorado 377 US 713 
(1964); Reitman v Mulkey 387 US 369 (1967); James v Valtierra 402 US 137 (1971). 
35 ‘Swiss Beauty Proud of her Maori Roots’ (2000) Courier-Mail, 19 September, p 11. 
36 Proposition, 187, approved by referendum on 8 November 1994. 
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Popular sovereignty and international market forces 
The other main objection to stronger implementation of popular sover-
eignty is that a populace, not comprehending the full import of economic 
and political factors, might attempt in vain to prevent or reverse some inevi-
table or necessary change. Now of course a people can no more legislate for 
the factually impossible than King Canute could stop the incoming tide, or 
the apocryphal American legislature could legislate that pi should equal 
three. But globalisation – as even The Economist admitted after the 1999 anti-
WTO protests – is not such a foregone conclusion.37 Unless and until it 
cedes its autonomy to a larger union, a society is entitled to try to insulate 
itself from external market or political influences if its voters see any benefit 
in trying. So if Switzerland refuses to join the European Union, or even the 
United Nations, that is its right.38 So Denmark votes against the Maastricht 
Treaty at its first referendum? Those in favour campaign harder, and the 
second time the majority votes ‘yes’. After all, joining a federation, or a 
quasi-federation like the European currency union, is probably irrevocable;39 
a society is entitled to think carefully before signing up. The argument ‘You 
are only delaying the inevitable’ may turn out to have been true; but even so, 
your state can still join the union later, like Denmark (or South Carolina and 
Rhode Island in 1779, or Newfoundland in 1948). A people has a perfect 
right to resist even the ‘inevitable’ while it can. 
 If the pressures are market forces rather than moves towards political 
union, the argument becomes more complex. Resistance to globalisation 
usually takes the form of calls to restore quotas or tariff protections, but the 
problem is that protecting one domestic industry may disadvantage another. 
If they had the legislative power, the people of Orange, NSW (where Email 
Ltd’s main factory is located) may well decide to protect whitegoods against 
import competition, and the people of Kingaroy might vote to protect pea-
nuts, to the disadvantage of importers and consumers. But no jurisdiction so 
small ever has power to make laws about overseas trade. The point above 
concerning federations applies here also: the people of each State have 
transferred their power over those matters to the people at the federal level. 
Even if CIR were available at the federal level, the national populace has 
such a variety of economic interests that a voter- (or Convention-)initiated 
referendum proposing higher or lower tariffs would likely be rejected on the 
prudent ground that such fine-tuning is best left to our parliamentarians – 
                                                        
37 J Smith and TP Moran (2000) ‘WTO 101: Myths about the World Trade Organisation’ 
47 Dissent (Spring) 70. 
38 Although some criticise this decision (KW Kobach (1993) The Referendum: Direct Democracy 
in Switzerland, Dartmouth, pp 201–2), it is hard to call Switzerland a worse ‘international 
citizen’ than many UN members (even some permanent sinecurists on its Security 
Council)! 
39  As the US South found in 1861–5, although contrast the (relatively) peaceful secessions 
of Singapore in 1965 and Slovakia in 1992. 
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just as, at the 1891 Convention, the delegates from the high- and low-tariff 
Colonies avoided the ‘lion in the path’ by agreeing to leave tariff levels to the 
majority in the new Parliament. And even if the sovereign people did enact 
something that turned out unworkable, they would retain the right and 
power to revoke the decision later.40 
Conclusion 
The idea of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ emerged in 17th century English 
revolutionary tracts, but was first given real effect in 18th century America. 
The idea that globalisation is inevitable is more ‘modern’ – but that does not 
mean that, in succumbing to this greater modernity, we Australians cannot 
also do some belated catching-up on an older wave of modernity. As we 
take our place in this brave new globalised world, we should do so as a na-
tion which recognises that – insofar as any nation preserves the old concept 
of sovereignty – that sovereignty should be exercised directly by its people. 
                                                        
40  For examples see KN Vines and H Jacob (eds) (1976) Politics in the American States: A 
Comparative Analysis, Little, Brown. 
